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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reverse payment agreements,1 in which a brand-name drug 
manufacturer makes a payment to a generic drug manufacturer to settle a 
patent dispute, have saved consumers billions of dollars by allowing 
generic manufacturers to enter the market before the brand-name’s patent 
has expired.2  A current debate in the pharmaceutical industry is the 
legality of reverse payment agreements in Hatch-Waxman litigation.3  
The crux of this dispute is whether reverse payment agreements amount 
to antitrust violations, effectively limiting trade.4  Many parties, 
including politicians and legal scholars, have attempted to tackle this 
issue but have yet to reach a consensus that balances both patent law and 
antitrust law concerns.5  In addition to the political and scholarly debate, 
the issue has also created a split in the federal courts.6 
This Comment advocates for the continued legality of reverse 
payment agreements and explores the regulatory background that has 
encouraged them.7  Recent court decisions favor the continued legality of 
reverse payment settlements.8  Moreover, these settlement agreements 
should be permitted as they effectuate the purpose of the Hatch Waxman 
Act, increasing market access for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.9  
By refusing to allow such settlements, the purpose of the HWA is 
frustrated through creating an environment that discourages settlement 
and thus prevents access to generic manufacturers for a longer period of 
                                                                                                                            
 1 Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494 (2007).  The “reverse” 
designation refers to the fact that the patent holder is paying the alleged infringer, rather 
than vice versa. Id. 
 2 Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate 
Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded-and Generic-
Pharmaceutical Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 651–52 (2008).  When a generic form 
of a drug enters the market it is able to offer a lower price because of lower development 
costs, while at the same time creating competition in the market. Id. 
 3 Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over 
Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2008). 
 4 See infra Part IV. 
 5 Andersen, supra note 3, at 1027–28.  Patent law and antitrust law, for practical 
purposes, are opposed to each other.  Id.  While patent law grants a right of exclusion, 
antitrust law promotes competition and equal access.  Id. 
 6 See infra Part IV. 
 7 See infra Part II. 
 8 Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Ark. Carpenters Health 
& Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 9 See infra Part V. 
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time.  Finally, a blanket declaration that all reverse payments are per se 
illegal is not a sound rule because it cuts against our judicial system’s 
fundamental policy in favor of settlement.10 
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act (HWA or “the Act”).11  The purpose of the HWA was to accelerate 
the approval process for low-cost generic versions of established drugs.12   
Specifically, the HWA added subsection (j) to 21 U.S.C. § 355, which 
described the process for an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA).13  This amendment allows generic drug manufacturers to 
obtain approval for a bioequivalent14 form of a drug that has already been 
approved for safety and effectiveness.15 As a result, generic 
manufacturers can bring a new drug to market at a much lower cost 
because the regulatory and testing process is far less comprehensive.16 
When filing an ANDA, a generic manufacturer must file one of 
four types of certification regarding the already existing drug to which 
the generic manufacturer claims bioequivalence.17  A paragraph IV 
certification, which certifies that the brand-name’s patent is invalid or 
                                                                                                                            
 10 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting 
the courts analysis would proceed under a longstanding preference for the settlement of 
litigation). 
 11 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 
1984, 22 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006), 98 Pub. L. No.98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
scattered sections of titles 21 and 35 of the United States Code); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191. 
 12 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191. 
 13 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). 
 14 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2010) (“Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant 
difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of 
drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an 
appropriately designed study.”). 
 15 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191; David W. Opderbeck, 
Rational Competition Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent 
Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1307 (2010). 
 16 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307. 
 17 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 
F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006)) (“An ANDA filer must certify, 
with respect to each patent that claims the listed drug for the bioequivalent of which the 
ANDA filer is seeking approval, either that no patent was filed for the listed drug (a 
‘paragraph I’ certification), that the patent has expired (a ‘paragraph II’ certification), that 
the patent will expire on a specified date and the ANDA filer will not market the drug 
until that date (a ‘paragraph III’ certification), or that the patent is invalid or would not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug (a ‘paragraph IV’ 
certification).” 
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would not be infringed by the generic’s product, brings up a unique set of 
issues and is the type of certification involved in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation.18  When a paragraph IV ANDA is filed, the filer must notify 
the affected patent owner of the certification, which enables that patent 
owner to bring suit against the ANDA filer for patent infringement 
within forty-five days.19  In fact, the filing of a paragraph IV certification 
is a per se act of patent infringement.20  If the patent owner does not 
bring a lawsuit, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is free to 
approve the ANDA immediately.21  But if the patent owner chooses to 
bring a lawsuit, the FDA will stay the ANDA approval for thirty months 
or until the court returns a decision regarding the validity of the patent or 
its infringement.22  This type of certification often leads a pioneering 
drug manufacturer, which holds the patent for the drug in question, to 
enter into a settlement agreement and make a reverse payment to the 
generic manufacturer.23  This reverse payment is made to not only end 
the litigation, but also to establish the time when the generic 
manufacturer can enter the market.24 
The HWA provides important incentives to generic drug 
manufacturers for choosing paragraph IV certification.25  First, the HWA 
allows challenges to already existing patents without the risk of incurring 
infringement damage costs as long as the generic drug has not been 
marketed.26  Second, the first ANDA filer of a paragraph IV certification 
will usually be entitled to an exclusivity period during which the FDA 
cannot approve any other ANDA filer until 180 days after: (1) the first 
day the first filer commercially markets the drug; or (2) a court 
determines that the patent in question is invalid or has not been 
infringed.27  These tremendously important incentives are the driving 
reasons for the rise of settlement agreements and reverse payments 
                                                                                                                            
 18 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006); Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307. 
 19 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C.  
§ 355(j)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 20 35 U.S.C.S. §  271(e)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (“It shall be an act of infringement 
to submit an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act [21 USCS § 355(j) . . . .”); Martin S. Masar III, Article, Effects of the Federal Circuit 
Judges on Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 
322 (2009). 
 21 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C.  
§ 355(j)(2)(B)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307–08. 
 24 Id. at 1308. 
 25 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 192; Opderbeck, supra note 
15, at 1307. 
 26 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308. 
 27 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(4)(B)(iv)(I)–(II) (2006). 
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between pioneering and generic drug manufacturers because the 
“[p]aragraph IV process changes the ordinary risk calculus for patent 
litigation,” as “[t]he patent owner risks losing its patent, but the alleged 
infringer does not risk a damage award.”.28 
III. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND REVERSE PAYMENTS 
Due to the incentives provided for generic drug manufacturers 
under the HWA, which encourage the filing of an ANDA under 
paragraph IV, brand-name drug companies are compelled to protect their 
exclusive patent rights.29  Brand-name drug companies have done this by 
negotiating compromises with their generic competitors through 
settlement agreements and reverse payments.30  These settlements are 
further encouraged by the fact that generic manufacturers have much to 
gain and little to lose by challenging the patent, while the exact opposite 
is true for brand-name manufacturers.31 
A reverse payment “has been used as shorthand to characterize a 
variety of diverse patent settlement agreements that involve a transfer of 
consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer.”32  The 
reverse designation refers to the fact that the payments flow from the 
patent holder to the alleged infringer, in contrast to settlements in typical 
patent litigation cases where payments flows from the alleged patent 
infringer to the patent holder.33  A reverse payment settlement will 
generally require the generic drug company to refrain from producing a 
generic form of a drug in return for monetary payment.34  While the 
                                                                                                                            
 28 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307. 
 29 Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve 
the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 460 (2008). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 459–60. The brand-name manufacturer, as the holder of the New Drug 
Application (NDA), has limited remedies when successful in HWA litigation.  Id. at 459.  
If the court holds the brand’s patent to be invalid or that the generic’s use is not 
infringing, the FDA approves the ANDA and the generic begins to market its version of 
the drug, which reduces the brand’s market share.  Id. at 459–60.  Even if the court holds 
the patent to be valid, the NDA holder is still likely to lose profits, because of lower 
prices and the loss of consumer loyalty.  Id. at 460.  Although the brand could force the 
generic out, the brand often will not do this for fear of ruining its public image, as 
consumers rely on the lower priced generic.  Id.  The circumstances are very different for 
the generic.  Id.  The generic stands to gain a tremendous profit by winning in litigation, 
but if it loses, those losses will be relatively small because it has practically no research 
and development costs to recoup.  Id.  These low research costs enable the generic to 
afford the millions of dollars required to litigate.  Id.  Therefore, the HWA sets up an 
environment where generics stand to gain greatly and lose little by litigating.  Id. 
 32 Holman, supra note 1, at 494. 
 33 Holman, supra note 1, at 494. 
 34 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307–08. 
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specifics of an agreement will vary on a case-by-case basis, these 
settlements often address the length of the generic marketing restriction, 
the market exclusivity period, and other licensing issues.35  The most 
radical form of settlement is one that terminates litigation and forces the 
generic manufacturer to wait until the patent expires to enter the 
market.36  In most cases, however, the patent holder and the generic 
company agree to some sort of reduction to the remaining patent term.37  
Term splitting most often results in the generic drug entering the market 
earlier than the point in which the patent would have originally expired, 
but later than would have been possible had the generic company won 
the litigation by proving the patent invalid.38 
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Reverse payments have been the subject of antitrust suits in 
multiple federal circuit courts and have resulted in a circuit split 
regarding the legality of the payments.39  These cases involve actions 
brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and private antitrust 
actions brought by interested third parties.40  The FTC has begun to 
equate reverse payments with market allocation agreements,41 which 
traditionally have been per se antitrust violations in cases not involving 
patents.42  The private antitrust actions often closely follow FTC 
actions.43 
Currently, there are four different opinions in the federal circuit 
courts regarding the legality of reverse payment settlements.44  The 
Second Circuit has reasoned that reverse payments are legal based on 
judicial policy that favors settlement.45  The Sixth Circuit has held that 
                                                                                                                            
 35 Id. 
 36 Holman, supra note 1, at 494. 
 37 Id. at 495; Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308. 
 38 Holman, supra note 1, at 495. 
 39 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308. 
 40 Id. 
 41 United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).  A market allocation 
agreement is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market made to 
minimize competition. Id. 
 42 Holman, supra note 1, at 531–32. 
 43 Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308. 
 44 Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2006); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 
344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 
2005); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 45 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187. 
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reverse payments are per se unlawful.46  The Eleventh Circuit has 
developed an approach that tests the exclusionary powers of a patent.47  
Finally, the Federal Circuit has determined that reverse payments are 
presumed legal because they are within the scope of the protection 
powers provided by a patent.48 
A. The Second Circuit 
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, the Second Circuit held that 
reverse payments should remain legal because the agreement did not give 
rise to an antitrust violation.49  The case provided an opportunity for the 
court to look at “issues at the intersection of intellectual property law and 
antitrust law.”50  Additionally, the court noted that although “the 
particular factual circumstances of this case are unlikely to recur, the 
issues presented have been much litigated and appear to retain their 
vitality.”51 
Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (“ICI”) developed Tamoxifen, a 
breast cancer drug, and passed ownership of the resulting patent to 
Zeneca, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Zeneca”).52  
In December 1985, four months after ICI was awarded the Tamoxifen 
patent, Barr Labs, Inc. (“Barr”) filed an ANDA requesting FDA approval 
to market a generic form of Tamoxifen.53  In September 1987, Barr 
amended its ANDA to include paragraph IV certification.54  ICI filed an 
infringement suit against Barr, which triggered the thirty-month stay of 
approval.55   
In April 1992, the district court declared ICI’s Tamoxifen patent 
invalid and ICI appealed.56  While the appeal was pending, Zeneca (the 
successor to ICI’s patent) entered into a settlement agreement with Barr 
in 1993.57  The settlement agreement between Zeneca and Barr stated 
that Barr would receive $21 million and a non-exclusive license to sell 
Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen under Barr’s label.58  Additionally, 
Barr agreed to change its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III 
                                                                                                                            
 46 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896. 
 47 See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056. 
 48 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323. 
 49 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 190. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 193. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 193. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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certification59 and therefore not market its own generic version until 
2002, when the patent expired.60  Eventually, the circuit court terminated 
the litigation in response to Zeneca’s and Barr’s joint motion to dismiss 
the appeal and vacate the judgment.61 
Following the execution of the agreement between Zeneca and 
Barr, consumers and consumer groups across the United States filed 
approximately thirty lawsuits that challenged the legality of the 
settlement agreement.62  The lawsuits were consolidated into a class 
action that alleged the settlement agreement effectively prevented other 
generic manufacturers from entering the market, directly inflating the 
price of Tamoxifen.63  In dismissing the lawsuit, the district court 
reasoned that while an agreement “between a monopolist and a potential 
competitor ordinarily violate[s] the Sherman Act,[64] [it is] not necessarily 
unlawful when the monopolist is a patent holder,” as long as the 
agreement is in good faith and does not try to go beyond the scope of the 
patent monopoly.65 
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision,66 
expressing a preference for settlement.67  The court held that reverse 
payments are not per se violations of the Sherman Act because it is not 
illegal for a patent holder to pay for the right to exclude68 when that right 
is already granted by a patent.69  The Second Circuit also noted that 
reverse payments are to be expected in a drug patent context due to the 
incentives provided by the HWA.70 
Addressing the plaintiff’s allegation that the mere size of reverse 
payments make them unlawful, the Second Circuit reasoned that the 
value of the reverse payment is of little concern as “long as the patent 
litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is 
seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is 
                                                                                                                            
 59 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)–(IV) (2006).  A paragraph III filing certifies that 
the ANDA applicant will not market the drug until the patent expires, where as a 
paragraph IV filing certifies that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed when the 
generic manufacturer enters the market. Id. 
 60 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 193–94. 
 61 Id. at 194. 
 62 Id at 196. 
 63 Id. at 196–97. 
 64 The Sherman Act, or Sherman Antitrust Act is a federal statute that governs 
monopolistic practices and illegal restraints of trade.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 65 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 197. 
 66 Id. at 466 F.3d at 206. 
 67 Id. at 202–03 
 68 The right to exclude is the patent holder’s statutory right to prevent others from 
making or using that same invention.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
 69 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 206. 
 70 Id. 
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presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and 
distribution of the patented product.”71  The plaintiffs argued that the 
reverse payment was greater than what Barr could ever have made in 
revenue by entering the market with its own generic product.72  The court 
stated that while large payments may protect weak patents, there is no 
reason to deem a patent invalid based on the size of the payment or on 
the patent holder’s fear of losing the patent.73  Further, the court stated 
that a rule restricting payment size would fail to give proper 
consideration to the patent holder’s incentive to settle the lawsuit as an 
insurance method against the possibility of losing a patent.74  Finally, the 
court noted that if a patent is truly too weak, the holder of that patent will 
be unable to continue making settlement payments as multiple generic 
manufacturers bring successive lawsuits.75 
B. The Sixth Circuit 
Directly contrasting the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit held 
reverse payments are illegal because they are unlawful restraints of 
trade.76  In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation., the settlement 
agreement was between Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMR”) and the 
generic manufacturer Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”), who was 
attempting to produce a generic version of HMR’s Cardizem CD, a heart 
and blood pressure medication.77  Andrx filed a paragraph IV 
certification in relation to HMR’s patent in late 1995.78  Subsequently, 
HMR filed a patent infringement suit against Andrx, which instituted the 
thirty-month stay on approval of Andrx’s paragraph IV certification.79  In 
September 1997, the FDA tentatively approved80  Andrx’s paragraph IV 
                                                                                                                            
 71 Id. at 208–09. 
 72 Id. at 208. 
 73 Id. at 210. 
 74 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 210. 
 75 Id. at 211–12. (“There is, of course, the possibility that the patent holder will 
continue to buy out potential competition . . . .  We doubt, however, that this scenario is 
realistic.”). 
 76 La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 77 Id at 899, 901. 
 78 Id. at 902. 
 79 Id. 
 80 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).  A generic manufacturer’s ANDA is granted 
tentative approval when a brand-name manufacturer has filed an infringement action 
against the generic manufacturer.  Id.  In such a case, the FDA has approved the 
substance of generic manufacturer’s ANDA, but withholds final approval until the end of 
a thirty-month stay or the infringement action reaches a conclusion, whichever is the 
earlier.  Id. 
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certification.81  As a result of this development, HMR entered into a 
settlement agreement with Andrx in September of 1997.82  The 
agreement contained numerous provisions, including one requiring HMR 
to pay $40 million per year to Andrx along with the potential of an 
additional $100 million per year given a second set of conditions.83  
Specifically, the agreement provided that Andrx would not produce its 
generic version of Cardizem CD until (1) there was a final determination 
that the Cardizem CD patent was invalid; (2) HMR and Andrx executed 
a license agreement; or (3) HMR entered a license agreement with a third 
party.84  Andrx also agreed to dismiss its counterclaims against HMR, “to 
diligently prosecute its ANDA, and to not ‘relinquish or otherwise 
compromise any right accruing thereunder or pertaining thereto,’ 
including its 180-day period of exclusivity.”85  In turn, HMR promised 
that the previously mentioned $40 million per year payments to be made 
to Andrx would begin when Andrx’s ANDA received final approval.86 
HMR also promised to pay Andrx $100 million per year, less any interim 
payments, when: (1) the patent was determined not infringed; (2) HMR 
dismissed the infringement action; or (3) there was a final ruling that did 
not decide the patent issues of validity or infringement and HMR did not 
refile its infringement action.87  Finally, HMR agreed not to seek 
preliminary injunctive relief in its continuing infringement litigation with 
Andrx.88  This agreement ended with final payments by HMR to Andrx 
totaling $89.83 million.89 
Plaintiffs challenging the agreement between HMR and Andrx 
commenced an action in August 1998 in the Eastern District of 
Michigan.90  The plaintiffs’ claim was that but for the settlement 
agreement, Andrx would have been able to bring its product to market at 
a lower price than HMR and that the agreement prevented other potential 
generic manufacturers from gaining market entry.91  According to the 
                                                                                                                            
 81 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902.  The tentative approval would 
have become final in July 1998 following the thirty-month stay required by the 
provisions of a paragraph IV certification or if HMR would have been unsuccessful in its 
infringement action against Andrx, which ever would have been sooner.  Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 902–03. 
 84 Id. at 902. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 903. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 903. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 904. 
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plaintiffs, the settlement agreement amounted to an antitrust violation 
under the Sherman Act.92 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the agreement was “at its core, a 
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for 
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of 
per se illegal restraint of trade.”93  The court reasoned that the settlement 
agreement could not be viewed simply as an effort to impose patent 
rights or as a temporary settlement to the infringement litigation.94  The 
court concluded “it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that 
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the 
patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only 
potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”95 
This was fundamental to the court’s holding that reverse payment 
agreements are per se illegal.96  The court further reasoned that by 
classifying reverse payments agreements as per se antitrust violations, 
courts would be able to presume such agreements were anticompetitive 
without a need to expend judicial resources to pinpoint the exact 
anticompetitive effects.97 
C. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payments in 
two separate cases, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. 98 and 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.99  In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that reverse payments are legal,100 effectively siding with the 
Second Circuit.  Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit determined that reverse 
payment agreements are not per se unlawful because they do not exceed 
the rights naturally granted by a patent.101 
Valley Drug Co. made its way to the circuit court after the district 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.102  
The lawsuit was filed in relation to two separate settlement agreements; 
one between Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) and Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals (“Geneva”) and another between Abbott and Zenith 
                                                                                                                            
 92 Id. 
 93 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 909. 
 98 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 99 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 100 Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1295. 
 101 Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1306. 
 102 Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1295. 
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Goldline Pharmaceuticals (“Zenith”).103  Abbot, the patent holder for the 
drug Hytrin, entered into separate settlement agreements with the generic 
manufacturers Zenith and Geneva.104 
Between 1993 and 1996, Geneva submitted multiple ANDA 
paragraph IV certifications related to various Hytrin patents held by 
Abbott.105  With one exception, Abbott filed patent infringement suits 
against Geneva for all of the paragraph IV certifications.106  Geneva 
admitted to infringement but contested the validity of the patents.107 
Zenith filed its ANDA paragraph IV certification in June 1994.108  
Abbott subsequently filed additional patents, which forced Zenith to 
amend its ANDA to bring it in line with the newly filed Abbott 
patents.109  Rather than amending its ANDA, however, Zenith filed suit 
against Abbott to: (1) force Abbot to delist the newly filed patents so that 
Zenith could avoid amending its ANDA; and (2) secure a declaration that 
it did not infringe Abbott’s patents.110  Abbott counterclaimed for 
infringement.111 
In March of 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into a settlement 
agreement that dismissed Zenith’s claims and Abbott’s counterclaims.112  
The agreement also required Abbott to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3 
million after three months, and an additional $6 million per quarter until 
March 1, 2000, as long as Zenith complied with certain clauses and 
contingencies of the agreement.113  Specifically, Zenith admitted the 
validity of the Abbott patents and agreed not to sell any form of the 
patented drug until another party did so or the patent expired.114  Zenith 
also agreed not to transfer its ANDA application to a third party or assist 
any other party in the development of a generic version of Abbott’s 
drug.115 
One day after the execution of the agreement with Zenith, Abbott 
and Geneva entered into a separate settlement agreement.116  The 
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agreement limited Geneva from selling or distributing any version of the 
patented drug until that patent was determined to be invalid, the patent 
expired, or another party began to sell a generic form of the drug.117 
Geneva also promised not to transfer its 180-day exclusivity period and 
to oppose any subsequent ANDA filer.118  In return, Abbott agreed to pay 
Geneva $4.5 million per month until another generic manufacturer 
brought its product to market or until Abbott succeeded on its 
infringement claim.119 
Following an action filed by the FTC, a class action suit 
commenced that alleged the agreements between Abbott and each of the 
generic manufacturers were per se illegal under the Sherman Act.120  On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the payments from the patent 
holder to the alleged infringer did not automatically amount to a 
violation of antitrust laws.121  The thrust of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
argument focused on the exclusionary powers of the patent.122  The court 
reasoned that while normally, a firm making monthly payments in 
exchange for a competitor’s acquiescence would violate antitrust laws, 
Abbott’s patent lawfully entitled it to exclude others.123  The court noted, 
however, that any agreement that extends the scope of the patent might 
raise antitrust concerns.124  The Eleventh Circuit also stated that even if a 
patent was subsequently declared invalid, exposing the patent holder to 
antitrust liability over any settlement agreement could undermine the 
innovation and the incentive to file patents.125 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payment 
settlement agreements again in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.126  
Similar to Valley Drug Co., the issue in Schering-Plough Corp. arose 
from two settlement agreements: one between Schering-Plough Corp. 
(“Schering”) and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (“Upsher”) and a 
second between Schering and ESI Lederele, Inc. (“ESI”).127  In late 1995, 
Upsher filed an ANDA with paragraph IV certification for its generic 
version of a Schering drug and Schering responded by filing a patent 
                                                                                                                            
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1301. 
 121 Id. at 1310–11. 
 122 Id. at 1304–06. 
 123 Id. at 1304. 
 124 Id. at 1312. 
 125 Id. at 1304, 1308 (noting that patents encourage investment and innovation, along 
with public disclosure of inventions). 
 126 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 127 Id. at 1058, 1060. 
214 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:201 
infringement suit.128  Before the trial began in 1997, Schering and Upsher 
executed a settlement agreement.129  The agreement stated that Upsher 
would delay market entry while Schering received licenses from Upsher 
and agreed to make an initial payment of $60 million dollars in addition 
to various milestone payments.130 
Also in 1995, ESI filed an ANDA with paragraph IV 
certification.131  Once again, Schering filed a patent infringement suit.132  
After engaging in court-supervised mediation for fifteen months, a 
settlement offer developed. Schering offered to divide the remaining 
patent life with ESI.133  In addition, Schering also agreed to pay $5 
million towards ESI’s legal fees and up to an additional $10 million if 
ESI received FDA approval by a certain date.134 
On March 30, 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint 
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI’s parent, American Home Products 
Corporation (“AHP”), alleging that the agreements were a restraint on 
trade, violating both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Sherman 
Act.135  The FTC argued that when a generic company receives anything 
of value to refrain or restrict its activities, an unlawful restraint on trade 
results.136 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the findings of the FTC and again 
turned to the exclusionary powers that are inherent to a patent.137  The 
court furthered this notion, stating, “a patent holder does not incur 
antitrust liability when it chooses to exclude others from producing its 
patented work.”138  With respect to patent and antitrust related issues, the 
court determined that one must examine: “(1) the scope of the 
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the 
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive 
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effects.”139  In applying this test to the facts, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that the agreements did not exceed the exclusionary provisions of 
Schering’s patent.140  Furthermore, the court reasoned that to prohibit 
reverse payments would “reduce the incentive to challenge patents by 
reducing the challenger’s settlement options should he be sued for 
infringement, and so might well be thought anticompetitive.”141 
D. The Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payments in In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, holding that reverse 
payments should remain legal because they do not extend the 
exclusionary zone of the patent.142  In October 1991, Barr143 filed an 
ANDA with paragraph IV certification for a generic version of the Cipro 
drug patented by Bayer A.G. and Bayer Corp. (collectively “Bayer”).144 
Bayer followed Barr’s ANDA with a patent infringement suit in January 
1992.145  But before trial commenced, Bayer entered into an agreement 
with Barr and its affiliated companies.146  In this agreement, Bayer 
agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million to change its ANDA to a paragraph III 
filing, which essentially required Barr to admit the validity of Bayer’s 
patent and wait until the patent expired to enter the market.147  Barr also 
pledged to refrain from manufacturing a generic version of Cipro in the 
United States.148  In return, Bayer would provide Barr with Cipro to sell 
under the Barr label or pay Barr a reverse payment once quarterly until 
December 31, 2003.149  Total payments from Bayer to Barr amounted to 
$398.1 million.150 
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In 2000 and 2001, the settlement agreement between Bayer and 
Barr was challenged by a series of antitrust actions.151  In this case, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, a 
decision that was affirmed by the Federal Circuit.152  The Federal Circuit, 
similar to the Eleventh Circuit,153 centered its argument on the 
exclusionary power of a patent.154  The Federal Circuit held that “the 
essence of the Agreements was to exclude the defendants from profiting 
from the patented invention.  This is well within Bayer’s rights as the 
patentee.”155  What’s more, the court noted that the law has a long-
standing policy that favors settlement and that policy applies to patent 
litigation.156  The court distinguished the facts of this case from the 
decision in the Sixth Circuit157 stating that the agreement in question 
there required the generic manufacturer not to give-up its exclusivity 
period and “provided that the generic manufacturer would not market 
non-infringing versions of the generic drug.  Thus, the agreement clearly 
had anticompetitive effects outside the exclusion zone of the patent.”158  
The court concluded that its analysis was entirely consistent with rulings 
in the Second and Eleventh Circuits and with Supreme Court 
precedent.159 
V. THE FUTURE OF REVERSE PAYMENT AGREEMENTS 
A ban on reverse payment settlements is not an appropriate solution 
to the circuit split regarding the legality of such settlements for two 
primary reasons.  First, reverse payment settlements harmonize with the 
overarching judicial policy in favor of settlement.  Second, reverse 
payments actually enhance competition and innovation while furthering 
the purpose of the HWA.  Therefore, because the Supreme Court has not 
granted certiorari to settle the split on the issue, other options must be 
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explored to determine what the best solution is for reverse payment 
settlements to remain presumptively legal.  The best option is for 
Congress to take action and provide new legislation that would clarify 
the HWA and create an environment that limits reverse payments by 
shifting some of the incentives currently contained in the Act.  These 
legislative changes would allow for closer regulation of reverse 
payments while preserving the important policy considerations of 
settlement and innovation. 
A. Supreme Court Intervention and Judicial Solutions 
While the contradiction in the circuit courts over the legality of 
reverse payments is an issue ripe for Supreme Court intervention, the 
Court has yet to grant certiorari.160  The Supreme Court could provide the 
lower courts valuable guidance that would enable more uniform 
decisions.  Furthermore, because such a robust circuit split exists 
regarding these reverse payments,161 the opposing views of the Sixth 
Circuit (advocating a per se illegality stance) and the remaining 
circuits162 (advocating for presumptive legality stance based on the 
exclusionary powers of a patent and the general policy in favor of 
settlement) will provide the Supreme Court with a plethora of case law 
on which to base its decision. 
Alternatively, some legal scholars have posited that a true circuit 
split does not exist.163  The argument is that the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
did not rule reverse payments to be illegal per se, but rather focused on 
the illegality of agreements that affect the 180-day exclusionary period 
for first filers and extended protection to products that did not infringe 
the patent at issue.164  According to some scholars, the Eleventh Circuit 
merely characterized the reverse payments as a troubling aspect of 
settlement agreements.165  The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ commentary 
reinforce the position that Supreme Court intervention is warranted. 
Finally, because the continued legality of reverse payment 
settlements is perhaps best validated by established judicial principles 
that favor settlement, the Supreme Court should step in to further its 
significant interest.  Our courts have a “longstanding adherence to the 
principle that ‘[they] are bound to encourage’ the settlement of 
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litigation.”166  Additionally, the general policy in favor of settlement 
“extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits”167 because “the 
nature of [it] is often inordinately complex and time consuming.”168  This 
policy is critical to reverse payment settlements because the act of filing 
a paragraph IV certification is considered by statute an act of patent 
infringement, settlement of which would be impossible without a reverse 
payment.169  Also, restricting settlement options creates an environment 
where the cost of patent enforcement is effectively increased, thereby 
“impair[ing] the incentives for disclosure and innovation.”170  Finally, 
“[n]othing in the legislative history supports a conclusion that Hatch-
Waxman lawsuits cannot be settled.”171 
It follows that a rule that makes reverse payment settlement 
agreements per se illegal would limit the options available to the 
litigants.172 The district court reasoned: 
If brand-name manufacturers are unable to control or limit their 
risk by settling Hatch-Waxman litigation, they, like generic 
manufacturers, may be less inclined to invest the research and 
development (“R&D”) costs associated with bringing new drugs 
to the market.  The pharmaceutical industry depends greatly on 
R&D and the economic returns to intellectual property created 
when a successful new drug is brought to market.  A rule 
prohibiting settlements of Hatch-Waxman patent litigation can 
have grave consequences for R&D and, in turn, severe 
consequences for consumers.173 
If the return-on-investment that brand-name drug companies receive 
from creating intellectual property decreases, then brand-name 
companies will not be able to adequately recover their research and 
development costs and new drug innovation will decrease.174  This would 
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result in fewer new drugs, the availability of which traditionally leads to 
a healthier United States population and growth for the economy.175 
B. Legislative Options 
Currently, there are bills pending in the United States Senate and 
the House of Representatives that would make reverse payments 
illegal.176  The Senate bill would prohibit an ANDA filer from receiving 
anything of value for agreeing to delay the development and deployment 
of a generic drug.177  Still, some legal scholars have posited that the strict 
limitations imposed by the Senate bill and a similar one in the House 
would be inappropriate in the context of a patent system and unduly 
hinder the rights of patent holders.178 
Rather than an absolute ban on reverse payments, Professor 
Christopher Holman has suggested that Congress introduce legislation 
requiring fee shifting in Hatch-Waxman litigation.179  Specifically, the 
hypothetical legislation would introduce a type of two-way fee shifting, 
sometimes called the “British-rule,” where the loser of the litigation pays 
the legal fees for both sides.180  By enacting this type of legislation, 
government could generally discourage litigation in the first place and 
therefore reduce the need for reverse payments.181  By forcing the loser 
of the litigation to pay for all of the litigation costs, each of the parties 
must take extra care in considering the merits of their case.182  This type 
of legislation would influence both sides of an ANDA paragraph IV 
dispute. 183 
On one side, the potential of having to pay the legal fees for both 
sides would presumably deter generic manufacturers from bringing 
unjustifiable paragraph IV certifications with the hopes of scoring a 
quick settlement from the brand-name manufacturer.184  Under such 
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circumstances, if the generic manufacturer filed a weak paragraph IV 
certification, the brand-name manufacturer would be able to recover its 
legal fees for defending a patent it strongly believed was valid, when it 
might have otherwise settled to avoid the costs of litigation.185  This 
would add a financial risk for generic manufacturers that does not 
currently exist under the HWA.186 
On the other hand, this scheme would force brand-name 
manufacturers to concede when one of its patent is weak or invalid.187  
This is because the brand-name manufacturer would not want to risk 
paying for all the litigation costs for both parties when it is likely that the 
brand-name manufacturer would lose the patent as a result of the 
paragraph IV litigation.188  Here, the brand-name manufacturer would be 
less likely to force the generic manufacturer into expensive litigation that 
might otherwise require the generic manufacturer to concede due to the 
fact that the generic manufacturer typically has far less financial 
resources.189  The brand-name manufacturer would no longer be able to 
use its financial clout to force the generic manufacturer into a settlement 
in a case where the brand-name manufacturer’s patent was weak.190  This 
would serve the purpose of the HWA by overturning invalid and weak 
patents.191 
By preventing (1) the generic manufacturer filing a baseless 
paragraph IV to obtain fast settlement payments and (2) the brand-name 
manufacturers from forcing generic manufacturers into litigation over 
what the brand-name manufacturer believes to be a weak or invalid 
patent, the need for reverse payments can be reduced to a far more 
limited set of circumstances.  No longer would either litigant incur the 
costs to dispute a weak argument asserted by the other party.  Rather, the 
parties could reserve reverse payment settlement agreements for those 
circumstances where each side has a legitimate belief in the validity of its 
argument, specifically, when the brand-name manufacturer believes its 
patent is strong and the generic manufacturer believes the contrary.  Only 
then would the brand-name and generic manufacturers enter a settlement 
agreement to avoid the uncertainty of patent litigation.192  The most 
likely result of settlements under this set of circumstances would allow 
for the generic manufacturer to get an earlier entry date and the brand-
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name to have additional time to recoup its development costs without 
either party losing the litigation and those respective benefits.193 
C. Enacting Stricter Regulation and Its Impact 
A ban on reverse payment settlement agreements, as proposed by 
bills currently in Congress,194 would not be appropriate primarily because 
of its chilling effect on the patent holder’s exclusionary rights.195  This is 
a view outlined in both the Eleventh and Federal Circuits’ decisions 
regarding reverse payments.196  Enforcement agencies have also weighed 
in, stating that settlement agreements are not anticompetitive simply 
because the agreement contains a reverse payment provision.197  
Specifically, the FTC has reasoned that because of the inherent 
complexity of patent litigation, any settlement agreement must be given a 
meaningful evaluation, rather than be presumed illegal on its face 
because of a reverse payment provision.198  Finally, legal scholars have 
also supported a more lenient approach than an absolute ban on reverse 
payments.199  The consensus among all of these groups indicates that the 
bill currently in Congress does not properly account for the rights of a 
valid patent holder.200 
Experts have argued that reverse payment settlement agreements 
can actually enhance competition and enable earlier entry of generic drug 
products.201  For example, reverse payments provided the only avenue for 
the generic manufacturers in both the Second and Federal Circuit cases 
to enter the market prior to the expiration of the brand-name 
manufacturers’ patents, as later cases involving those same brand-name 
manufacturers and other generic companies verified the validity of the 
brand-name manufacturers’ patents.202  Therefore, the generic 
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manufacturers in those two cases would have been blocked from 
bringing their product to market by the valid patent if not for the 
settlement agreements that granted them earlier access.203 
Additionally, reverse payments can also foster a procompetitive 
atmosphere in two circumstances.204  The first is where the parties to the 
litigation fail to assess their likelihood of a successful outcome.205  The 
second is where the generic manufacturer would be willing to negotiate 
an entry date, but is financially unable to maintain operations until that 
date without a payment from the brand-name manufacturer.206  The first 
situation is procompetitive because reverse payments allow opposing 
sides to use payments to balance the risks associated with proceeding 
with the unpredictability of a trial decision.207  The second situation 
encourages competition, as the generic manufacturer gets the dual benefit 
of payment, which keeps the generic manufacturer financially viable, and 
early entry, which stimulates competition in the market.208  In sum, a ban 
on reverse payment settlements, while eliminating the anticompetitive 
drawbacks, would also eliminate the procompetitive incentives that allow 
early entry for generics in situations where that would not otherwise be 
possible.209 
The ban on reverse payments and on stricter regulations regarding 
these payments would also have a significantly adverse effect on the 
ability of parties to settle.  Any legislation that does so would cut against 
the general principle that favors settlement over litigation.210  This would 
present a particularly difficult problem in pharmaceutical litigation, 
where settlement is already unusually hard to achieve.211  Pharmaceutical 
patent litigation, however, has two distinct qualities that make patent 
holders desire settlement.212  First, the patent holder has a tremendous 
amount to lose if it does not succeed on its infringement claim.213  
Second, patent litigation is inherently unpredictable, such that even the 
most confident patent holder could be unsure as to whether a court might 
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find the patent in question invalid.214  Therefore, allowing reverse 
payments makes settlement possible.215  By making a reverse payment, 
the patent holder is able to keep the generic company off the market and 
thus make a profit in an exclusive market.216  Without the ability to make 
the reverse payment as a hedge against losing at trial, the patent holder 
has no incentive to settle and will await the court’s final determination on 
the validity of the patent because the generic manufacturer is not going to 
accept an agreement that limits market entry without some sort of 
compensation.217  Therefore, with no way to limit the generic 
manufacturer’s entry to the market via a settlement agreement, the patent 
holder has nothing additional to lose by going to trial. 
Stricter regulations such as those noted above could have a 
considerable impact on the ability of parties to settle disputes in the 
context of Hatch-Waxman litigation.  While current proposals in 
Congress aim to eliminate reverse payment agreements,218 perhaps a 
more moderate alternative exists.  One possible solution is for 
government to impose a statutory system that regulates reverse payment 
agreements rather than banning them outright.  By outlining specific 
criteria that agreements must follow, the government could carefully 
control what is going on in a reverse payment agreement and ensure that 
the agreement does not cross the lines of antitrust law.  This would not 
only preserve the ability of the parties to settle, but would allow for more 
regulatory oversight of the agreement.  The oversight process could 
include regulation of a number of areas from payment values, which 
might be set based on a generic’s anticipated profit, to actual market 
entry date. 
In particular, the focus of any legislation that regulates reverse 
payments should be on the economic terms of the agreement.  
Specifically, the regulations should limit the maximum amount of a 
reverse payment.  The limit for the maximum payment could be based 
upon the projected profit that the generic manufacturer would make by 
entering the market with its own version of the brand-name 
manufacturer’s drug.  That maximum amount, however, should be 
reduced by an amount that would reflect the cost the generic 
manufacturer would incur by litigating a paragraph IV certification to 
conclusion through trial with a final verdict as to the validity of the 
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brand-name manufacturer’s patent.  This reduction is necessary to 
appropriately balance the rewards and risks between the brand-name 
manufacturer and the generic manufacturer. 
Under this proposed scheme, the generic manufacturer stands to 
gain the same amount of money that it would have by successfully 
litigating its paragraph IV certification and entering the market, but 
without the risk of losing that litigation.  The generic manufacturer 
would have the incentive to settle and take the payment described 
because it would not be able to gain anything additional by litigating, 
other than proving the patent to be invalid or not infringed.  The 
reduction in the maximum payment by the amount of the generic 
manufacturer’s litigation costs is necessary to avoid the situation where a 
generic manufacturer files a paragraph IV certification with no intent to 
actually litigate it, only hoping to get a fast settlement from the brand-
name manufacturer.  This situation represents a bonus to the generic as 
the brand-name manufacturer settles quickly to avoid the uncertainties of 
litigation and the generic manufacturer has risked nothing.  Meanwhile, 
because the terms of any reverse payment agreement would require the 
generic manufacturer to attest to the validity of the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent, the generic manufacturer should only want to 
litigate in a situation where it was confident that it would win the 
paragraph IV litigation.  This is because winning the paragraph IV 
litigation would allow the generic manufacturer to enter the market 
immediately and is the only benefit that the generic manufacturer could 
obtain going through litigation. 
On the other side, the brand-name manufacturer gains the 
advantage of keeping its exclusive use of the market without incurring 
costs to litigate and risk a loss in paragraph IV litigation.  This retention 
of an exclusive market is critical because it gives the brand-name 
manufacturer more time to recoup its investment in the drug 
development process.219  Moreover, when the brand-name manufacturer 
is allowed to settle through a reverse payment it avoids the costs of 
litigation that can also hurt the brand-name manufacturer’s profits.  The 
more efficiently a brand-name manufacturer recovers its investment in a 
drug and begins earning a profit from it, the sooner the brand-name 
manufacturer can reinvest those profits in future drug development and 
innovation.220 
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Additionally, this scheme would be assisted by requiring the 
reverse payment agreement to include an early market entry provision 
that would allow the generic manufacturer to enter the market at some 
point earlier than the end of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent term.  
This early market entry should be regulated using a set of guidelines that 
would attempt to provide benefits to both the parties.  In particular, the 
brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer should split the 
remaining term of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent.  For half of 
that period, the brand-name manufacturer would continue to enjoy its 
complete and total market exclusivity.  Then, in the second half of the 
remaining patent term, the generic manufacturer would be allowed to 
enter the market.  Significantly, however, the brand-name manufacturer 
and the generic manufacturer would be forced to enter into a licensing 
agreement for this remaining term of the patent.  This is because the 
brand-name manufacturer still has its patent rights, as the patent is 
presumptively valid.  Therefore, the generic manufacturer must pay the 
brand-name manufacturer for the right to use that technology. 
The benefits of the above licensing scheme would be two-fold.  
First, the brand-name manufacturer would be able to recover more of its 
investment through licensing fees.  Second, the generic would be allowed 
to enter the market earlier than would have otherwise been possible due 
to the patent right of the brand-name manufacturer.  The earlier entry of 
the generic would be a benefit to consumers because the generic 
manufacturer would be able to offer lower prices for its version of the 
patented drug.221  Then upon the expiration of the patent, the generic 
could enter the market without paying licensing fees and the price of the 
generic version of the drug would presumably drop again, which is a 
further benefit to consumers. 
D. Reverse Payments Serve the Purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
“The Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984 with the dual 
purposes of reimbursing pharmaceutical patent holders for time lost on 
the effective life of the patent due to the approval process of the FDA 
while also encouraging generic drug manufacturers to enter the market, 
including providing incentives to challenge invalid patents or develop 
non-infringing drugs.”222  Prior to the HWA, only thirty-five percent of 
brand-name drugs generated generic competitors.223  This is no longer 
the case today, as virtually all patented drugs spawn a generic 
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competitor.224  Reverse payment settlements have generally contributed 
to this trend.  For example, generic forms of Prozac and Paxil entered the 
market three years early and saved consumers an estimated $2.5 billion 
and $2 billion, respectively.225  A generic form of Prilosec came to 
market fifteen years before its patents expired, saving consumers an 
estimated $360 million per year.226 
Reverse payments also serve the HWA’s purpose of providing a 
brand-name manufacturer patent term extension so that the brand-name 
manufacturer can recoup more of its development costs.227  In the case of 
a reverse payment, the circumstances are more like a “quasi-patent term” 
extension because a settlement agreement extends the brand-name 
company’s patent rights in instances where the generic would have been 
successful in its paragraph IV filing.228  On the other hand, a settlement 
agreement forces the brand-name manufacturer to give up its patent 
rights earlier than would be required when the brand successfully 
defends against a generic company’s paragraph IV filing.229  Extended 
market exclusivity is critical because it allows the brand-name to recoup 
more of its investment.230  When a brand-name is able to recoup more of 
its investment, it is able to reinvest more in future development.231  
Without recovering investment, brand-name manufacturers would not be 
able to produce today’s ground-breaking new drugs.”232  It follows that 
without these brand-name drugs there would be nothing for the generic 
manufacturers to replicate and learn from, but more importantly “there 
would be little hope of finding new treatments and cures,” because 
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innovation would become prohibitively expensive for brand-name 
manufacturers233 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Reverse payment agreements should continue as legal and 
exploitable methods of resolving litigation under the HWA because they 
serve the Act’s purpose of allowing generic drug manufacturers to have a 
more efficient route in gaining approval for their product so that they 
may bring it to the market.  The Act establishes a statutory structure that 
encourages reverse payment settlement agreements.  These agreements 
have been the topic of scholarly, regulatory, and even circuit court debate 
because these payments raise possible antitrust violations.  One view, 
expressed by the Sixth Circuit and certain experts, reasons that such 
payments should be per se illegal, as they do in fact violate antitrust 
laws.  Nonetheless, to make a blanket decree that these reverse payments 
are per se illegal is not sound policy and could result in more negative 
consequences.  Furthermore, creating a per se illegality standard for 
reverse payment agreements clashes with patent law’s exclusionary 
principals.  Therefore, the decisions rendered in the Second and Federal 
Circuits represent a more sound policy that reverse payments should be 
presumed legal.  As long as these reverse payments do not extend the 
scope of the patent, they are not creating a restraint of trade that would 
not already exist via the monopoly granted by a patent.  Taking away the 
ability to enter into a reverse payment settlement eliminates one of the 
major advantages and reasons to settle patent disputes without litigation. 
This effect goes against the longstanding policy of favoring settlement 
over litigation and is perhaps the best reason for allowing reverse 
payment settlements to continue.  Finally, reverse payments have 
become an important by-product of the HWA.  In many cases reverse 
payments further the Act’s purpose of granting generic drug 
manufacturers earlier access to the market, thereby providing consumers 
with more affordable generic drugs. 
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